

Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: Quest for Power and the Role of National Security Council

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Abstract

The military has always played a dominant role in Pakistan for the last seventy years or so. From an administrative and political point of view, Pakistan has inherited a highly imbalanced institutional development. It was working with strong and organized civil and military bureaucracies and disorganized political parties led by self-seeker politicians. The main reason for this institutional imbalance was factional-ridden politics which weakened the political rule in Pakistan. The civilian control of the military is managed in Pakistan if the ruling political group is ready in sharing power and responsibility with the military elites. Since Pakistan is a developing country and the military cannot be an exit from the decision-making process. The sharing of power on particular subjects can take the military away from any direct intervention. The sharing of power and responsibilities can be managed with the application of the convergence theory of Morris Janowitz and the National Security Council is an ideal forum for the interconnectedness of the two main pillars: the civilian and military elites.

Keywords: Civil-military relations, politics, culture, Security-Council, vacuum, leadership

Introduction

A healthy civil-military relationship is generally an accepted norm in a democratic setup, where an elected civilian government exercises control over the military, and the military played its role as a subordinate institution of the civilian government. Unfortunately, in Pakistan, control of government has been fluctuated between the two over the past 70 years or so: a decade of civilian supremacy followed by a decade of military rule. Similar to the other third-world countries, the phenomenon of military intervention in Pakistan remains one of the most significant political factors. The frequent military interventions in Pakistan from General Ayub Khan to General Musharraf are a reflection of immature democratic institutionalization due to the vacuum of leadership, weak political institutions, and weak political parties. The perception that has emerged of Pakistan's democratic process is based on discontinuity in relative activities like delaying elections, dissolution of governments, and furtherance the process of undemocratic values. Throughout the history of Pakistan, the military has tried to interfere in the political system directly or indirectly, however it often staged a direct military coup.

The 20th century witnessed the experience of military involvement in the government system

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of many countries. Military intervention in the political life of nations became apparent after the end of World War II (Kaleem & Umer, 2015). The military is considered one of the most powerful institutions in a country, especially in developing countries, in terms of the country's external and internal security. In these developing countries, the military not only intervened in the political process and overthrew the constitutional civil setup, but also established its dominance over elected politicians. In developed countries, the role and functions of the armed forces are different from the role and function of the armed forces in developing countries. In developed countries, the military's roles are clearly defined. Various theories are explaining the reasons for military intervention in politics. Different theorists and political scientists have given different models and approaches to military interventions as well as these theorists have given their expert opinions to bring the balance of power between the two main pillars of the state. The theories of the two pioneer political scientists are as under.

Samuel P. Huntington

Huntington argues that civil-military relation is the competition between the two institutions, one is the military that represents the armed forces, the other is the civilian institution that represents the government who in a democracy also represents a polity. The competition between the military and the civilian is for acquiring power which he (Huntington) defined as the capacity to control the behavior of other people (civilian) (Huntington, 1957) Military interference in politics is very common in the emerging democratic system. Samuel P. Huntington is an American political scientist and he has given objective and subjective control approaches to rendering the military subservient and politically sterile role viz-a-viz the civilians. The Objective Control and Subjective Control" are the two contrasting models for democratic control. Huntington contends that objective control is preferable to subjective control. He explains that objective civilian control insures the recognition of autonomous military professionalism (Huntington, 1957, p. 83). The objective civilian control is the guarantee to the protection of the civilian society from external enemies and from the military itself. This type of control (objective control) is aimed at maximization of military professionalism by separating political and military decision-making. The military is obliged to carry out the orders of the civilians and the political leaders do not interfere in military matters. For example, the civilians do not give orders to the military that how many soldiers, as well as weapons, are needed for any operation. Keeping in this point of view, the military officers would remain politically neutral as part of their professional ethos.

Subjective control is aimed at the maximization of power of the civilian government and this would also decrease the military power and the maximizing of civilian power means the maximizing of the power of some particular group or groups (Huntington, 1957, p. 80). Subjective control revolves around the distribution of power among the civilian elites rather than between the civilian authority and the military. The governing political party gains the maximum power and the political leaders try to control the armed forces by appointing the high-ranking generals who are the close companions of the political leaders. And so, the criteria for occupying the high military position are not military skills and professionalism but political loyalty. Samuel Huntington's argued that the expanded professionalization of military men leads their withdrawal from the political issues is risky when it is connected to third World countries. The criteria of professionalism applied by Huntington don't really

prompt all the more politically traditionalist armed forces (Huntington, 1957, pp. 233-37). Given the particular situation in Pakistan, the relevance of this model is questionable, while the Pakistani military cannot be neutral and sterile using professionalism. Some commentators have also argued that the neutrality of the armed forces and their separation from politics, as prescribed by Huntington, may only have to do with the West, if not mere fiction.

Morris Janowitz

Morris Janowitz has given a different approach to civil-military relations and he rejected the ideal type of division of labour as was given by Huntington. He expressed his concern over an apolitical approach of the military, drifting away from societal values and assuming too much power through autonomy. He suggested that the military's role be always responsible and circumscribed to the civilian authority (Janowitz, 1960). In reacting to Huntington's statements Janowitz creates the theory of "convergence" in which he aims to address the same puzzle but he arrives at a contrary conclusion. His theory states that "more the military in touch with the civilian life the less likely outright interference of the one side into the other because as there will be no chance for an ideological difference to develop (Gruber, 2015). Basically, Janowitz opposes Huntington's professional ideal and opts for more pragmatic professionalism. Having served in the military services and being a sociologist himself, he preferred to take a sociological view of the military institution. In the words of Peter Feaver, "Like Huntington, Janowitz focuses on the officer corps and the concept of professionalism. However, Janowitz rejects the ideal-type division of labor that Huntington claims is [are] essential for the military professionalism" (Feaver, 1996). Military sociologically is very much close to the general public through its interactive mechanism, so there is likely to be less possibility of military intervention due to the diffusion of ideological difference.

Huntington looks at civil-military relations from the perspective of a political scientist, whereas Janowitz looks at civil-military relations from the perspective of a sociologist. Both agreed that professionalism is important to civil-military relations. While Huntington maintains that being apolitical is a key to a professional military. Janowitz argues that making a military-like constabulary force and integrating the military with society is more effective (Sarkesian, 1984). Morris Janowitz had predicted that armed forces would transform into constabulary forces, i.e., and international police forces. These armed forces do not attempt to win a war at all costs but to establish peace in inter/international disputes. In Janowitz's view, the integration and not separation of the military and the political system guarantees the alignment of political and military goals. The military and political leaders decide together about the direction and implementation of military goals because the politicians and the military officers are depending on each other.

Janowitz studied the military and its relationships with society as a whole, not just the elite. His "Convergence Theory" focuses on finding ways to reduce rather than emphasize or divide civilian-military differences. The war (outwardly or internally) in his opinion is a joint venture, and according to the events of the Cold War, he continued to suggest the constabulary concept as a model to address the aspects of civilian control (Janowitz, 1960, p. 418). Janowitz differed methodically in Huntington's approach to professionalism as a means of inhibiting military intervention in politics. He concludes that protecting democracy is a civic responsibility of a soldier achieved through greater interconnectedness (Janowitz,

1960). Its theoretical and structural construction of association and relationship is of interest for this study of civil-military relations in Pakistan. In this context, cooperation between the civilian and military elites can ensure the consolidation of democracy and effective control of the armed forces.

Janowitz focuses most of his study not specifically on civil-military relations in democracies but on the study of the American Military also. His study centers on the sociological aspects of the military and indirectly on civil-military relations. He uses American Military as a case study to support his concept of constabulary force. Janowitz discusses how changes in technology affect the military, how militaries respond to these changes, and their effects on civil-military relations. He states that these changes make the military more civilianized but these changes do not make the civilians more militarized (Janowitz, 1960, p. 31). Janowitz recognizes that these are the challenges for the military is trying to remain outside of the political arena but still reinforces the necessity to try to stay out of politics. The way for the military to adjust to the dilemmas of advanced technology and to avoid undue participation in politics is to transform into the constabulary force. The constabulary force will allow the military to maintain its professionalism and integrate more with the civilian populace.

Janowitz provides a parallel theory to that of Huntington, where Huntington maintains that to keep the military professional it should remain outside the society. Janowitz believes that the military and society should be integrated to ensure better civil-military relations. This is a more subjective view of civil control as described by Huntington. Janowitz's belief that the blurring of lines between the military and the civilians runs counter to Huntington's belief that the military should remain separate and autonomous from the civilian in order to maintain its professional integrity. Both these scholars however agree that the military must maintain its professionalism.

Before the application of these theories on the political system of Pakistan, let's we must understand the history of civil-military relations in Pakistan and why the military intervene in the power corridor.

Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations describe the relationship between civil society as a whole and the military organization or organizations created to protect it (James, 2002). Civil-military relation is a general concept that includes a diverse, often normative area that moves within the framework of government, social sciences, and politics. In an open society, the military enjoys professional autonomy, submitting itself to the political authorities. In the true relationship, the military plays a secondary role in the implementation of defense and security policies; where civil decisions are hypothetically accepted as final. The basis of civil-military relations is a dilemma: what Peter Feaver has called the civil-military problematic, which requires a certain policy to balance two concerns. On the one hand, it must create a military establishment strong enough to protect the state. On the other hand, it must somehow ensure that this very military establishment does not turn against the state that has established it (Feaver P. , 1996).

Military Intervention

Military intervention according to Fawole (1994), is defined as the conscious act of displacing and supplanting an existing political order, a government by soldiers with the objectives of

governing or influencing the political affairs of the country in the particular direction determined largely by the interventionist themselves.

History of Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan

Pakistan like India had inherited governing system left by the British. But there was a difference, while India got its institutions intact and Pakistan had to start from scratch. From the administrative and political point of view, Pakistan inherited highly imbalanced institutional growth. It was functional with strong and organized civil and military bureaucracies and unorganized political parties headed by self-seeker politicians. The main reason for institutional imbalance was factional-ridden politics which had been led to make political governance weak in Pakistan. The weak organizational structure of the Muslim League and provincial outlook paved the way for an anarchic state in Pakistan's parliamentary system. Delaying in the direct election could not let the parties organized in a democratic way which failed to build trust and confidence among the masses. In these circumstances, the democratic process failed to take root deep enough to make Pakistan politically a stable state. In the absence of any permanent constitution and democratic tradition, K. B Sayyid in one of his articles noted that at the end of its first ten years, "Pakistan was very much like Hobbes' state of nature¹, where every political or provincial group fought against every other group. It was a ceaseless and ruthless struggle for power" (Sayyid, 1959). Therefore the lack of political organizations and social bases can influence the running government, while the non-military personnel elites need the ability to prepare their supporters in adjusting the military forces. As consequence, the military can mediate and assume control over the civilian-led government.

The weak political and civilian institutions became the major cause of military intervention. For Huntington, the sources of military intervention in politics are not only a keen interest of the military itself but also the result of weak political institutions and the low political culture of developing countries like Pakistan (Dawood, 2014). Weak leadership and weak governance have been a major source of military interference in Pakistan's politics since its inception. Shuja Nawaz believes that after the death of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, the state has faced a leadership vacuum (Nawaz, 2008).

Pakistan is among those countries where the military has had a great influence in its political life. The transition of civilian rule started right after the foundation of Pakistan. Jinnah took hold of the civilian rule as a Governor-General by organizing the political institution along with the administrative ones with the promising claim of a republic. Before the independence of Pakistan in the year 1943, he remarked that democracy is in our blood, it is in our soul (Mahmood, 2010). He was very clear that Pakistan would be a democratic state. In 1948 during his visit to Dhaka, he told Srish Chandra Chattopadhyay, "Tell your people not to be afraid and not to leave Pakistan, for Pakistan will be a democratic state where Hindus will have the same rights as Muslims" (The Nation, 2015). But unfortunately, he died on September 11, 1948. After Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaquat Ali Khan the first Prime Minister of Pakistan contributed toward the continuation of democracy in Pakistan, he

¹ According to Hobbes (Leviathan, 1651), the state of nature was one in which there were no enforceable criteria of right and wrong. People took for themselves all that they could, and human life was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."

too could not serve Pakistan for a long time and was shot dead in 1951 at Rawalpindi. These earlier demises of Pakistani leadership had not bid well and Pakistan suffered chaos and anarchy in its political system. The next line of leadership was not yet well prepared to take the responsibility to put Pakistan on a democratic line. Most of the leaderships after Jinnah had regional and local stature and did not have a nationwide appeal. Jinnah's successors lacked not only his stature but also political neutrality. Ghulam Muhammad and Iskinder Mirza both dabbled into power politics and played the part of kingmakers. Both of them rose to this elevated position from the rank of government services. They also lacked parliamentary spirits. The rapid shift in the office of the prime minister reflected the political as well as the democratic instability in Pakistan. Ghulam Muhammad dismissed Prime Minister Khawaja Nazim-ud-Din in 1953 and dismissed the National Assembly in October 1954 (Wheeler, 1955). Pakistani leaderships were not prepared to accomplish the task to formulate a functional constitution. Prime Minister Chaudhary Muhammad Ali gave Pakistan a constitution in 1956. The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan established Pakistan as a republic state and reflected the democratic principles in a parliamentary form of government. Chaudhary Muhammad Ali was forced to resign by the new Republican Party in September 1956. Mr. Iskinder Mirza who succeeded General Ghulam Muhammad as Governor-General of Pakistan was a strong advocate of "Controlled Democracy" (Mahmood, 2010, p. 360). When Iskinder Mirza came to know that he had no chance to be re-elected as the president of Pakistan, he conspired with General Ayub Khan. General Ayub Khan, when he was the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army and the defence Minister wrote in his diary in August 1958:

I am receiving very depressing reports of economic distress and maladministration through political interference, frustration and complete lack of faith by the people in political leaders... The general belief is that none of these men have the honesty of purpose, integrity and patriotism to root out the evils of the country, which will require drastic action" (Gohar, 1996). The action was taken when Iskinder Mirza declared Martial Law in the country on October 7, 1958, and appointed Gen. Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. But the President Iskinder Mirza himself had to quit on October 27, 1958, and General Ayub Khan assumed the office of the President of Pakistan. The dejected public widely and sincerely hailed the military coup in Pakistan. President Ayub Khan regarded as the rescuer, began his rule with the expression of approval from the public. In Dosso Case military coup was accepted as legal means to change the government and people accepted it as a revolutionary step to change the government (Azeem, 2017). Ayub Khan justified the coup on the basis that the country had to be rescued from chaos. This became the repeated maxim for all the succeeding military takeovers in Pakistan. During the period 1947-1958, Pakistan had overthrown seven prime ministers which were evidence of weak political institutions in Pakistan.

General Ayub Khan handed over the government to General Yahya Khan who ruled in Pakistan from 1969 to 1971. After the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, democracy returned to Pakistan for a short while under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which was once again overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq in July 1977. Zia ruled the country for more than a decade. Democracy did return to Pakistan after Zia's death in a plane crash in 1988 but could not function smoothly during the 1990s due to ever-present military involvement in Pakistani politics. During the 1990s, Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto ruled the country alternatively

but no one completed their full term in the office of the premier for five years, while the political process was hampered time and again. From 1988 to 1999, though the military did not directly intervene in power politics, yet it played its role as a praetorian moderate. Praetorian moderates try to influence government decisions without assuming any political power (Nordlinger, 1977). In 1999, General Pervez Musharraf took over the government in a coup d'état against Nawaz Sharif and thus derailed the democratic process in Pakistan for the next nine years. After the 2008 General Elections, democracy has again returned to the country.

The role of the National Security Council

Almost all over the world, all states have institutional systems and processes that enable key civilian and military leaders to consult with each other, harmonize their views and coordinate their efforts to formulate policies on internal and external security issues. These could be purely individual agreements created by the ruler with the participation of his close friends and advisers. The ruler decided whether and when a consultation was needed. Sometimes this consultation can be very personal and informal. There may also be a well-thought-out and formal body of committees, subcommittees, and key civil and military officials that meet by formal agreement to exercise well-defined powers. The composition of institutions and processes for developing national security policy depends on the nature and dynamics of the political system as well as the character and orientation of the ruling elite.

The concept of the National Security Council is not new. It is also established in the major democracies of the world. The United States, the United Kingdom, India, Turkey, Iran, and Israel have institutions of the National Security Council. The NSC was first established in the United States by an Act of Congress in July 1947. It has been consisting of seven members including the President, the secretary of state, the minister of defence, the army, the navy, and the air force, and the chairman of the Council for National Security Resources. The NSC advises the US President on a variety of issues, including foreign policy, military planning, coordination and evaluation, and the leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (BRESCIA, 1950). Similarly, in the UK in May 2010, the NSC was formed by Prime Minister David Cameron to coordinate the efforts of various departments and agencies to strengthen all aspects of national security (PILDAT, 2012).

India established the National Security Council (NSC) in November 1998, and it was headed by Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The Indian NSC had a three-tier structure. At the top was a body of seven members. It is chaired by the Prime Minister and it also includes the Ministers of Interior, Defence, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and the Vice President of the Planning Commission. It is important to note that the military did not have a high level of representation in the National Security Council. However, three service chiefs, particularly the army chief, may be invited to attend a meeting of the National Security Council if necessary. For example, Indian Army Chief General NC Vaj attended a meeting of the National Security Council in July 2004 and it was the first meeting of the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance government chaired by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Similarly, Turkey, Iran, and Israel have national security councils (PILDAT, 2012).

National Security Council in Pakistan

The idea of establishing a National Security Council or similar high-level body in Pakistan was

generally supported by the Pakistani military government, active and retired military personnel, and their civilian colleagues. The real argument is that the military should be included in the policy-making framework regularly because of the role it has played in the field of security and domestic policy. During the military government of Yahya Khan, the first NSC was established and Major Gen Ghulam Omer became its first secretary. The NSC made no difference to the military government's decision-making process because Yahya Khan ran the administration individually and relied on his trusted military and bureaucratic advisers. Major General Omar was one of Yahya Khan's key advisers and worked in this capacity. However, in the Yahya era, the role of the NSC was merely a paper organization.

Despite strong opposition from political parties, General Zia decided to set form a National Security Council (NSC) with powers to "Make recommendations relating to the issue of the proclamation of Emergency under Article 232 of the constitution, security of Pakistan and other matter of national importance that may be referred to it by the President in consultation with the prime minister" (Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997*, 2000, p. 257) The NSC got its legal foundation under the Article 152-A² as the part of the RCO in 1985. Zia's NSC was consisting of eleven members including the President as the chairman of the council. The rest of the members in the council were the Prime Minister, Chairman Senate, the CJCS, the Chief of the Army Staff, the Chief of Navy Staff, the Chief of the Air Staff, and the four provincial Chief Ministers. According to Hassan Askari Rizvi, granting indefinite powers to the NSC ensures the direct role of the military leadership in the constitutional and political structure. To some extent, as a researcher I also agree with his statement, however, the military is also a part of the society and in Pakistan, the military has too much say in government affairs. So the combination of the civil-military coalition in the council may counter the ideological differences. In that way, there would be chances to reach agreements on different strategic, defence, security, and political issues. According to Janowitz, integration, rather than separation of the military and political system, ensures that political and military goals coincide. Military and political leaders together decide on the direction and implementation of military goals, because politicians and the military are dependent on each other. The National Security Council was opposed by the majority of the political circles and had to be abandoned as part of a deal with parliament in order for parliament to approve a revised version of the RCO as an 8th Amendment to the Constitution in October 1985 (PILDAT, 2012, pp. 18-19).

President Farooq Leghari dissolved the National Assembly in November 1996, and just a month before holding the elections, President Leghari issued a presidential order to establish Council for Defence and National Security (CDNS) in January 1997. The Council for Defence and National Security (CDNS) was similar to the NSC. It was a new constitutional body headed by President Leghari. The members of this council were the Defence Minister, the Interior Minister, the Chief of Army Staff, the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee, the Chief of Naval Staff, and the Chief of Air Staff (Ziring, 1997, p. 590). The President of Pakistan was the chairman of the council. The CDNS was responsible for advising the federal cabinet on the

² Article 152-A is about the National Security Council. - (1) There shall be a National Security Council to serve as a forum for consultation on strategic matters pertaining to the sovereignty, integrity and security of the State; and the matters relating to democracy, governance and inter-Provincial harmony.

preparation of defence policy, its coordination with foreign and domestic policy, and other issues related to the security and stability of the country. Its first meeting was held on January 8, 1997, under the chairmanship of President Leghari at the *Aiwan-e-Sadar* (Presidency). The first meeting discussed the issues related to the accountability of politicians and bureaucrats involved in corruption and the approval of the decision to hold general elections on February 3, 1997 (Anjum, 2008). However, the CDNS evoked sharp criticism from the opposition and they considered it an unconstitutional institution of the caretaker government. They argued that if the CDNS was an important decision and it should be passed by the parliament but the president has enacted it without parliamentary approval. The Senate has also argued that the establishment of a National Security Council is unconstitutional and an attempt by President Leghari towards the presidential system in the country (Daily Nawaiqat, 1997).

After the 1997 general elections, Nawaz Sharif emerged as a strong Prime Minister of Pakistan. His party the PML-N secured a two-thirds majority in the parliament. Nawaz Sharif made some of the decisions where the judiciary and the military the judiciary has some reservations about Nawaz Sharif political style. These reservations in the end led to the reservation of President Farooq Leghari and Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah. The military wanted a well-balanced political system in the country, where power was checked and balanced by other institutions. During this internal crisis, the military elites felt that the National Security Council (NSC) could play a significant role. Gen. Karamat was reluctant in communicating that the military would henceforth be involved in politics, but he was forced to do so in the meeting of the corps commanders on September 19, 1998, at the GHQ (Nawaz, *Crossed Swords*, 2008, p. 498). The deterioration of civil-military relations reached the highest level when Army Chief Gen. Karamat floated the idea of NSC in his lecture at the Naval Staff College in Lahore on October 5, 1998. He considered that the formation of the NSC would provide stability to the political system. The need for such an upper body for decision-making in the past was emerged during the interim government by President Farooq Leghari and General Karamat was the part of that council. However, the politicians considered it as a power-sharing and the foreign minister in the Nawaz Cabinet Mr. Sartaj Aziz identified that in the view of emerging challenges he was himself deliberating on the need for such a body and it would be named as Cabinet Committee on Defence and National Security (CCDNS) (Aziz, 2009, p. 200).

Nawaz Sharif took umbrage to these developments and considered it a political intervention from the military. The Army Chief was invited to explain his idea on NSC to the Prime Minister. The prime minister was not convinced by the explanations of the Army Chief on NSC. This compelled the COAS to resign. Gen. Karamat's willingness to resign confirms that the military had taken a back seat, was professionalizing and expecting the political elites to deliver. This was the 2nd time in the entire history of Pakistan when a serving chief was forced to resign from the post of COAS. Here the civilian authorities enjoyed the highest level of authority and it reflects the idea of subjective civilian control of Huntington. Subjective control is aimed at the maximization of power of the civilian government and this would also decrease the military power and the maximizing of civilian power means the maximizing of the power of some particular group or groups (Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, 1957, p. 80).

On October 12, 1999, Gen Musharraf took over the power after sacking Nawaz Government in a military coup. However, after a while, like his predecessors, General Ayub Khan and Zia-

ul-Haq, General Musharraf also established a democratic system in Pakistan. This democratic system under the military umbrella is called guided or controlled democracy. In August 2002, before the general election, Musharraf issued an LFO in which he amended twenty-nine articles of the 1973 Constitution (Khan, 2009). Under this LFO, he legitimized the dubious referendum he held in his presidency. The most controversial element in the LFO was the introduction of Article 152-A into the Constitution. The LFO tasked the National Security Council (NSC) with overseeing the country's security policies as well as overseeing the process of democracy and governance in Pakistan. When the Seventeenth Amendment was moved in the parliament for approval, Musharraf wished to institutionalize the NSC by turning it into a constitutional body through LFO. But the pro-Musharraf parties did not have the required majority in the parliament that's why after the negotiation between the ruling party PML-Q and MMA, article 152-A was removed from the Seventeenth Amendment. However, both the parties agreed that NSC was to be created through the legislative process rather than the constitutional process (Shah, 2014).

Meanwhile, the 17th Amendment was passed by the parliamentarian without Article 152-A related to NSC; however, the parliamentarian started working on the draft legislation for NSC, which was completed in January 2004. The opposition criticized the NSC bill. They argued that the NSC bill would curtail the powers of the parliament. The opposition parties boycotted the sessions of both houses of the parliament when the NSC bill was placed before the parliament for approval. However, during this process, the MMA stayed in the houses of the parliament but abstained from voting for the NSC bill. The MMA did not oppose the bill on the promise that Musharraf will remove his uniform in December 2004. On April 19, 2004, the National Security Council (NSC) Act 2004 was passed from the parliament which provided for NSC consisting of the President as its chairman. The other members of the NSC were the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, the Chairman of the Senate, Chief Ministers of the four provinces. The Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee and the three services Chiefs of Pakistan (Chief of Army Staff, Chief of the Air Staff, and the Chief of the Naval Staff) were the members of the NSC (Khan, 2009, p. 496).

The NSC was created to serve as a forum for consultation on strategic matters pertaining to sovereignty, integrity, and security of the state and the matters related to the quality of democracy, governance, and inter-provincial harmony. In that way, the NSC can refer on issues of the national interest requiring the implementation to the National Assembly or the Senate for appropriate action, as there is the representation of the National Assembly and the Senate in the presence of the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the leader of the opposition if the National Assembly, and the Chairman of the Senate. The first formal meeting of the NSC was held in January 2004 and the meeting focused on the deteriorating law and order situation in Pakistan. Unexpectedly, the first meeting was not attended by opposition leader Fazal-ur-Rehman. Musharraf and his supporters in parliament, however, insisted that the NSC would reduce the chances of future military coups by providing a "safety valve", a forum in which the military can play a role without dissolving the National Assembly (The Dawn, 2004). However, the opposition parties the PML (N) and the PPP criticized the NSC as they considered it a step against democratization in Pakistan. The inclusion of four men in uniform in the NSC leaves no doubt in anyone's mind as to who will be calling the

shots.

As mentioned earlier that there is the concept of the 'National Security Council' and its functioning in the western democratic states. Since its inception except for the few early years, Pakistan is considered a military dominant state and as a researcher, I am also convinced with the statements of the critics like Saeed Shafqat, Ishtiaq Ahmed, Ian Talbot, and Lawrence Ziring that Pakistan is the military dominant state. Therefore, the concept of the Pakistan National Security Council is not a strange idea. The members of this council are a combination of civil and military leadership. No doubt we cannot exit the military involvement in the political setup, since the military is more advanced and is interacted in the political setup in Pakistan for the past 70 years or so. According to Morris Janowitz's Convergence theory, "more the military in touch with the civilian life the less likely outright interference of the one side into the other because as there will be no chance for an ideological difference to develop." Janowitz rejects the ideal type of division between civilian and military institutions. He believes that the military sociologically is very much close to the general public through its interactive mechanism, so there is likely to be less possibility of military intervention due to the diffusion of ideological difference. The NSC was responsible for advising the federal cabinet on defense policy preparation, its coordination with foreign and domestic policy, and other issues related to the country's security and stability. Council members, including military and civilian authorities, will come together and discuss the country's affairs, and all issues will be resolved based on mutual consensus. It was a forum that could easily resist the imposition of martial law and the application of Article 58 (2) (B). In order to uphold the democratic process in Pakistan, it is necessary that the army also be given a share in the affairs of the country. This will create an atmosphere of cooperation between the military and the civilian leadership and reduce differences. Over time, the democratic process will gradually become more sustainable and Pakistan will emerge as a democratic state over time. In this process, the military must also play its part in respecting civilian institutions in the decision-making process. The chairman of the Security Council must be a civilian president or head of government, and he must consult with members of the National Security Council in decision-making on all matters.

The National Security Council forum is the major part of this article and here as a researcher, I agree with the convergence theory of Morris Janowitz that the military is sociologically is very close to society, as every military man is also the part of society. According to Morris Janowitz's theory of convergence, "the more the military is in intact with civilian life, the less likely it is for one side to directly interfere with the other because there will be no chance of developing ideological differences." Janowitz rejects the ideal type of division between civilian and military institutions. He has strongly believed that the military sociologically is very much close to the general public through its interactive mechanism, so there is likely to be less possibility of military intervention due to the diffusion of ideological difference. The NSC should be given responsibility for advising the federal cabinet on defense policy preparation, its coordination with foreign and domestic policy, and other issues related to the country's security and stability. Council members, including military and civilian authorities, will come together and discuss the country's affairs, and all issues will be resolved based on mutual consensus. It is a forum that could easily resist the imposition of martial law and the application of Article 58 (2) (B).

Conclusion

In order to uphold the democratic process in Pakistan, it is necessary that the army also be given a share in the affairs of the country. This will create an atmosphere of cooperation between the military and the civilian leadership and reduce differences. Over time, the democratic process will gradually become more sustainable and Pakistan will emerge as a democratic state over time. In this process, the military must also play its part in respecting civilian institutions in decision-making. The chairman of the Security Council must be a civilian president or head of government, and he must consult with members of the National Security Council in decision-making on all matters. It may take more than a decade or two for the civilian elites to go with the military through this NSC forum. However, the time will come when the civilian institution would be in a position to have all awareness on the strategic, defence, and security issues of the state. The military forces should also give weightage to the civilian institutions and over time, the military will return to their barracks, when they do realize that now the civilian institutions have the capacity to make the decisions as per society demands.

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